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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CRYSTAL BYRD; BRIAN BYRD, Individually, and on 
Behalf of all Similarly Situated Persons, 




AARON’S INC; ASPEN WAY ENTERPRISES INC, 
d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, A Franchisee of 
Aaron’s Inc.; 
DESIGNERWARE LLC; AH & H LEASING LLC, 
d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of 
Aaron’s, Inc.; 
AMG ENTERPRISES GROUP LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s 
Sales and Leasing, 
a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; ARONA CORPORATION 
d/b/a Aaron’s Sales 
and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; BEAR 
RENTAL PURCHASE LTD, 
d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of 
Aaron’s, Inc.; 





a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; CIRCLE CITY 
RENTALS, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; CMH LEASING 
PARTNERS, LLC, 
d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of 
Aaron’s, Inc.; 
CRAM LEASING, INC., d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DC SALES AND LEASE INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DIRIGO LEASING INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DPR ALASKA LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DPR COLORADO LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DW3 LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
DWC VENTURES LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
FAIRWAY LEASING LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
FIVE STAR FINANCIALS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales 
and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
FT GOT THREE LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, 
a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
GNS & ASSOCIATES INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 




GREAT AMERICAN RENT TO OWN INC, d/b/a 
Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
GREEN RIVER CORP, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, 
a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
HANSON HOLDING CO, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
HONEY HARBOR INVESTMENTS LLC, d/b/a 
Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
HOWARD RENTS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
HPH INVESTMENTS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
J&L BEACH ENTERPRISES INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales 
and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
J.R. RENTS, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
J.M. DARDEN AND CO, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
JENFOUR LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
JENKINS RENTAL LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
KFJ ENTERPRISES LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
LIFESTYLE FURNITURE LEASING, d/b/a Aaron’s 
Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
LTL INVESTMENTS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 




Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
MKW INVESTMENTS INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
NO THREE PUTTS ENTERPRISES LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s 
Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
NW FREEDOM CORP, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
POMONA LANE PARTNERS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales 
and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
R & DOUBLE K LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, 
a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
REBCO INVESTMENTS LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
REX NEAL INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
ROYAL RENTS INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, 
a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
ROYAL ROCKET RETAIL LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales 
and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
SHINING STAR, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
SHOWCASE HOME FURNISHINGS INC, d/b/a 
Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
SULTAN FINANCIAL CORP, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and 
Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
TANGLEWOOD MANAGEMENT LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s 
Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
TDS FOODS INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 




TUR INC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee 
of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT CORP, d/b/a Aaron’s 
Sales and Leasing, a Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
WGC LLC, d/b/a Aaron’s Sales and Leasing, a 
Franchisee of Aaron’s, Inc.; 
JOHN DOES (1-45) AARON’S FRANCHISEES 
_____________ 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
 Plaintiffs Crystal and Brian Byrd bring this 
interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Byrds brought a putative 
class action against Aaron’s, Inc. and its franchisee store 
Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”), 
who they allege violated the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2511.  
Concluding that the Byrds’ proposed classes were not 
ascertainable, the District Court denied their motion for 
class certification.  Because the District Court erred in 
applying our ascertainability precedent, we will reverse 
and remand. 
I. 
 Aaron’s operates company-owned stores and also 
oversees independently-owned franchise stores that sell 
and lease residential and office furniture, consumer 
electronics, home appliances, and accessories.  On July 
30, 2010, Crystal Byrd entered into a lease agreement to 
rent a laptop computer from Aspen Way, an Aaron’s 
franchisee.  Although Ms. Byrd asserts that she made full 




2010, an agent of Aspen Way came to the Byrds’ home 
to repossess the laptop on the grounds that the lease 
payments had not been made.  The agent allegedly 
presented a screenshot of a poker website Mr. Byrd had 
visited as well as a picture taken of him by the laptop’s 
camera as he played.  The Byrds were troubled and 
surprised by what they considered a significant and 
unauthorized invasion of their privacy. 
 Aspen Way obtained the picture and screenshot 
through spyware—a type of computer software—
designed by DesignerWare, LLC and named “PC Rental 
Agent.”  This spyware had an optional function called 
“Detective Mode,” which could collect screenshots, 
keystrokes, and webcam images from the computer and 
its users.  Between November 16, 2010 and 
December 20, 2010, the Byrds alleged that this spyware 
secretly accessed their laptop 347 times on eleven 
different days.1  In total, “the computers of 895 
                                                 
1 The spyware allegedly captured a wide array of 
personal information: “credit and debit card numbers, 
expiration dates, security codes, pin numbers, passwords, 
social security numbers, birth dates, identity of children 
and the children’s personal school records, tax returns, 
personal health information, employment records, bank 
account records, email addresses, login credentials, 
answers to security questions and private 




customers across the country . . . [had] surveillance 
conducted through the Detective Mode function of PC 
Rental Agent.”  Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-
101E, 2014 WL 1316055, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 
2014). 
 The Byrds’ operative class-action complaint 
asserts claims against Aaron’s, Aspen Way, more than 50 
other independent Aaron’s franchisees, and 
DesignerWare, LLC.2  The complaint alleges violations 
                                                                                                             
attorneys, and other confidants.”  The record also reveals 
what appear to be screenshots of adult-oriented and 
active webcam transmissions and conversations of an 
intimate nature. 
The spyware, as described in the Byrds’ complaint, 
was Orwellian-like in that it guaranteed that “[t]here was 
of course no way of knowing whether you were being 
watched at any given moment,” George Orwell, 1984, at 
3 (Signet Classics 1950), because Aspen Way’s corporate 
intranet (and Aaron’s corporate server by proxy) 
apparently activated the PC Rental Agent’s Detective 
Mode “whenever they wanted to.”  Id.   
2 On March 20, 2012, the District Court issued an 
order noting that DesignerWare filed for bankruptcy in 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, the District Court ordered 
that no action be taken against DesignerWare and that the 




of and conspiracy to violate the ECPA, common law 
invasion of privacy, and aiding and abetting.  On 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court 
dismissed the claims against all Aaron’s franchisees other 
than Aspen Way for lack of standing and also all claims 
for common law invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and 
aiding and abetting.  Thus, the Byrds’ remaining claims, 
and those of the class, are against Aaron’s and Aspen 
Way for direct liability under the ECPA. 
 In the meantime, the Byrds moved to certify the 
class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 
and 23(b)(3), in which the Byrds provided two proposed 
classes and one alternative proposed class.3  In briefing 
                                                 
3 In the motion for class certification, the Byrds 
proposed the following classes: 
Class I (against Aaron’s Inc. for direct liability 
under ECPA) –  
All persons residing in the United 
States, who have purchased, leased, rented 
or rented to own, Aaron’s computers and 
individuals who used said computers whose 
personal information, electronic 
communications and/or images were 
intercepted, used, disclosed, accessed, 
monitored and/or transmitted via PC Rental 
Agent or other devices or software without 




                                                                                                             
Class II (against Aaron’s Inc., Aspen Way, and all 
other Franchisee Defendants for direct liability under 
ECPA, invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and aiding and 
abetting) –  
All customers of the Aaron’s 
Defendants who reside in the United States, 
who have purchased, leased, rented or rented 
to own, Aaron’s computers and individuals 
who used said computers whose personal 
information, electronic communications 
and/or images were intercepted, used, 
disclosed, accessed, monitored and/or 
transmitted by the Aaron’s Defendants via 
PC Rental Agent or other devices or 
software without the customers [sic] 
authorization. 
Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *4.  The Byrds also set forth 
an alternative class definition for Class II as:  
Class II (against Aaron’s Inc., and Aspen Way for 
direct liability under the ECPA, invasion of privacy, 
conspiracy, and aiding and abetting (under Wyoming 
law)) –  
All persons residing in the United 
States, who have purchased, leased, rented 
or rented to own, Aaron’s computers from 
Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Aarons 




the motion, the Byrds proposed the following alternative 
class definitions: 
Class I – All persons who leased and/or 
purchased one or more computers from 
Aaron’s, Inc., and their household members, 
on whose computers DesignerWare’s 
Detective Mode was installed and activated 
without such person’s consent on or after 
January 1, 2007. 
 
Class II – All persons who leased and/or 
                                                                                                             
used said computers whose personal 
information, electronic communications 
and/or images were intercepted, used, 
disclosed, accessed, monitored and/or 
transmitted by Aspen Way and/or Aaron’s 
via PC Rental Agent or other devices or 
software without the customers [sic] 
authorization. 
Id.  It is worth noting that the Byrds’ revised 
proposed class definitions did not expressly require 
an electronic communication to be “intercepted,” 
although that is a necessary element in 
successfully proving their ECPA claims.  See 18 




purchased one or more computers from 
Aaron’s, Inc. or an Aaron’s, Inc. franchisee, 
and their household members, on whose 
computers DesignerWare’s Detective Mode 
was installed and activated without such 
person’s consent on or after January 1, 2007. 
Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *5. 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the 
Byrds’ motion for certification because the proposed 
classes were not ascertainable.  Regarding owner and 
lessee class members, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
that the proposed classes were underinclusive because 
they did “not encompass all those individuals whose 
information [was] surreptitiously gathered by Aaron’s 
franchisees.”  Id.  The Magistrate Judge also determined 
that the classes were “overly broad” because not “every 
computer upon which Detective Mode was activated will 
state a claim under the ECPA for the interception of an 
electronic communication.”  Id.  Regarding “household 
members,” the Magistrate Judge took issue with the fact 
that the Byrds did not define the phrase.  Id.  Further, 
although the Byrds stated that the identity of household 
members could be gleaned from “public records,” the 
Magistrate Judge, citing to Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 
F.3d 300, 306, 308 (3d Cir. 2013), reasoned that “[i]t 
[was] not enough to propose a method by which this 
information may be obtained.”  Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, 




Recommendation as the opinion of the court over the 
Byrds’ objections.  The Byrds timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f).  “We review a class certification order 
for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district 
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.”  Grandalski v. Quest 
Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 
354 (3d Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We review de novo a legal standard applied by a district 
court.  Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305. 
III. 
 The central question in this appeal is whether the 
District Court erred in determining that the Byrds’ 
proposed classes were not ascertainable.  Because the 
District Court confused ascertainability with other 
relevant inquiries under Rule 23, we conclude it abused 
its discretion and will vacate and remand. 
 Before discussing these errors, however, we 




the ascertainability requirement that our cases have 
articulated.  Our ascertainability decisions have been 
consistent and reflect a relatively simple requirement.  
Yet there has been apparent confusion in the invocation 
and application of ascertainability in this Circuit.  
(Whether that is because, for example, the courts of 
appeals have discussed ascertainability in varying and 
distinct ways,4 or the ascertainability requirement is 
                                                 
4 For example, some of our sister courts of appeals 
have interspersed their analysis of ascertainability, or 
“identifiability,” with explicit Rule 23 requirements.  See, 
e.g., Colo. Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing ascertainability and numerosity 
simultaneously); Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 385 
F. App’x 423, 431 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) 
(discussing ascertainability but reversing class 
certification based on lack of typicality); In re Initial 
Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 44-45 (2d Cir. 
2006) (discussing ascertainability and predominance 
simultaneously, although noting they are separate 
inquiries), decision clarified on denial of reh’g sub nom. 
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d 70 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing identifiability—the Seventh 
Circuit’s approximation of the “ascertainability” 
standard—in conjunction with the typicality 




                                                                                                             
Conversely, others have framed ascertainability as 
requiring that there be an “objective standard” to 
determine whether class members are included in or 
excluded from the class without reference to any 
particular portion of Rule 23.  See, e.g., EQT Prod. Co. v. 
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358–60 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining 
the Fourth Circuit’s implicit “readily identifiable” 
requirement for a proposed class is the same as our 
Circuit’s “ascertainability” requirement, without 
discussing the source of the standard); In re Deepwater 
Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 821 (5th Cir. 2014) (requiring a 
class to be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. 
denied sub nom. BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Lake 
Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014); 
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (discussing only that the “presence of such an 
objective criterion overcomes the claim that the class is 
unascertainable”); Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 
1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (mentioning ascertainability 
but ruling under Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance standard); 
Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513–14 (applying an 
“identifiab[ility]” standard without discussing the source 
of the rule); Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 972 
(10th Cir. 2004) (noting an “identifiability” requirement 
for 23(b)(3) classes but declining to apply the standard to 




implicit rather than explicit in Rule 23,5 we need not 
                                                                                                             
Even the citations we relied upon in Marcus v. 
BMW of North America, LLC, to discuss the policy 
rationales behind ascertainability, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d 
Cir. 2012), failed to address squarely the undergirding for 
this implicit requirement.  See, e.g., Xavier v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (relying in part on our decision in Newton v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 
154, 191–93 (3d Cir. 2001), which in fact analyzed a 
proposed class under Rule 23(b)(3) and the superiority 
requirement); Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 
441, 446 & n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (blending the issue of 
ascertainability with class definition and cross-
referencing a later discussion on predominance and 
superiority); Federal Judicial Center, Manual for 
Complex Litigation § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004) (citing to 
Rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that class members in a Rule 
23(b)(3) action receive the “best notice practicable”). 
5 Ascertainability is an “essential prerequisite,” or 
an implied requirement, of Rule 23, “at least with respect 
to actions under Rule 23(b)(3).”  Marcus, 687 F.3d 
at 592–93.  Marcus identified “important objectives,” id. 
at 593, or policy rationales, supporting the 
ascertainability requirement.  These included removing 
administrative burdens that were “incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected in a class action,” providing the 




say.)  Not surprisingly, defendants in class actions have 
seized upon this lack of precision by invoking the 
ascertainability requirement with increasing frequency in 
order to defeat class certification.6   
 We seek here to dispel any confusion.  The source 
                                                                                                             
Rule 23(b)(3) action, and protecting defendants by 
ensuring that those persons ultimately bound by the final 
judgment could be clearly identified.  Id. at 593.  Our 
opinion in Carrera expanded on some of the concerns 
addressed in Marcus, specifically relating to a 
defendant’s “due process right to challenge the proof 
used to demonstrate class membership.”  727 F.3d at 307. 
6 See, e.g., Class Action Reporter, Courts 
Scrutinize Class Certification “Ascertainability,” Vol. 
17, Feb. 6, 2015, (explaining that “courts across the 
country are increasingly scrutinizing ‘ascertainability’ at 
the class certification stage”); Melody E. Akhavan, 
Ascertainability Challenge Is Viable Weapon for 
Defense, Law360, Nov. 26, 2014, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/599335/ascertainability-
challenge-is-viable-weapon-for-defense (“Courts’ focus 
on ascertainability has become an increasingly useful tool 
for defendants fighting class certification.”); Alida Kass, 
Third Circuit Case Could Limit Consumer Class Actions, 
N.J. Law Journal, June 25, 2014 (“[T]he Third Circuit 





of, or basis for, the ascertainability requirement as to a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class is grounded in the nature of the class-
action device itself.  In endeavoring to further explain 
this concept, we adhere to the precise boundaries of 
ascertainability previously iterated in the quartet of cases 
we discuss below.  The ascertainability requirement as to 
a Rule 23(b)(3) class is consistent with the general 
understanding that the class-action device deviates from 
the normal course of litigation in large part to achieve 
judicial economy.  See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 
(discussing generally the nature of the class-action 
device).  Ascertainability functions as a necessary 
prerequisite (or implicit requirement) because it allows a 
trial court effectively to evaluate the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23.  In other words, the independent 
ascertainability inquiry ensures that a proposed class will 
actually function as a class.  This understanding of the 
source of the ascertainability requirement takes a 
forward-looking view of the administration of the Rule 
23(b)(3) class-action device in practice. 
A. 
 The class-action device is an exception to the rule 
that litigation is usually “‘conducted by and on behalf of 
the individual named parties only.’”  Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano 
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).  
Accordingly, the party proposing class-action 




demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence her 
compliance with the requirements of Rule 23.  Id.  And a 
court evaluating a motion for class certification is 
obligated to probe behind the pleadings when necessary 
and conduct a “rigorous analysis” in order to determine 
whether the Rule 23 certification requirements are 
satisfied.  Id.; In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Jan. 16, 
2009).  A plaintiff seeking certification of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the class is ascertainable.7  Hayes, 725 F.3d 
at 354.  The rigorous analysis requirement applies 
equally to the ascertainability inquiry.  Carrera, 727 F.3d 
at 306. 
 The ascertainability inquiry is two-fold, requiring a 
plaintiff to show that: (1) the class is “defined with 
reference to objective criteria”; and (2) there is “a reliable 
                                                 
7 In Shelton v. Bledsoe, we held that 
ascertainability is not a requisite of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.  
775 F.3d 554, 559–63 (3d Cir. 2015).  The Byrds sought 
certification of their proposed classes under both Rule 
23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).  Lacking the benefit of our 
Shelton decision, the District Court denied certification 
without distinguishing between Rule 23(b)(2) and 
Rule 23(b)(3).  Accordingly, the District Court on 
remand should also consider whether the classes may be 




and administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class 
definition.”  Id. at 355 (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., 
LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012)).  The 
ascertainability requirement consists of nothing more 
than these two inquiries.  And it does not mean that a 
plaintiff must be able to identify all class members at 
class certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show 
that “class members can be identified.”  Carrera, 727 
F.3d at 308 n.2 (emphasis added).  This preliminary 
analysis dovetails with, but is separate from, 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s requirement that the class-certification 
order include “(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise 
statement of the parameters defining the class or classes 
to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and 
complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be 
treated on a class basis.”  Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 187–88 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
 We have on four occasions addressed the 
requirement that a Rule 23(b)(3) class be “ascertainable” 
in order to be certified.  Our quartet of cases began with 
Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC, in which we 
adopted this implicit ascertainability requirement.  687 
F.3d at 592–94.  We explained, “If class members are 
impossible to identify without extensive and 
individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class 




the proposed class “raise[d] serious ascertainability 
issues,” largely because the plaintiffs could not identify 
cars with the allegedly defective run-flat tires.  Id. at 593.  
The defendants did not maintain records that would 
demonstrate whether a putative class member’s run-flat 
tires “‘ha[d] gone flat and been replaced,’ as the class 
definition require[d],” and the plaintiffs had not proposed 
“a reliable, administratively feasible alternative” to 
identify class members.  Id. at 594. 
 Shortly thereafter, in Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., we straightforwardly applied the ascertainability 
rule established by Marcus and remanded the case to the 
district court to apply Marcus’s standard and to allow the 
plaintiffs to “offer some reliable and administratively 
feasible alternative that would permit the court to 
determine” whether the class was ascertainable.  725 
F.3d at 355.  That same month, we decided Carrera v. 
Bayer Corp., an appeal involving the proposed 
certification of a “class of consumers who purchased 
Bayer’s One-A-Day WeightSmart diet supplement in 
Florida.”  727 F.3d at 303.  To prove ascertainability, the 
plaintiff proposed using retailer records and class 
member affidavits attesting to purchases of the diet 
supplement.  Id. at 308.  Although we opined that retail 
records “may be a perfectly acceptable method of 
proving class membership,” we noted that the plaintiff’s 
proposed retail records did not identify a single purchaser 




therefore rejected the proposed methods of proving 
ascertainability. 
 As to the use of affidavits, we began by explaining 
that in Marcus, “[w]e cautioned ‘against approving a 
method that would amount to no more than ascertaining 
by potential class members’ say so.’”  Id. at 306 (quoting 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594).  We rejected the plaintiff’s 
proposed methodology to screen out false affidavits 
because the plaintiff’s expert declaration did not establish 
that the “affidavits will be reliable” or “propose a model 
for screening claims.”  Id. at 311.  Remarkably, even the 
named plaintiff could not recall whether he had 
purchased the diet supplement.  Id. at 311 n.9.   
 We were careful to specify in Carrera that 
“[a]lthough some evidence used to satisfy 
ascertainability, such as corporate records, will actually 
identify class members at the certification stage, 
ascertainability only requires the plaintiff to show that 
class members can be identified.”  Id. at 308 n.2 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, there is no records 
requirement.  Carrera stands for the proposition that a 
party cannot merely provide assurances to the district 
court that it will later meet Rule 23’s requirements.  Id. 
at 306.  Nor may a party “merely propose a method of 
ascertaining a class without any evidentiary support that 




 Following the Marcus-Hayes-Carrera trilogy, we 
again considered the issue of ascertainability in 
Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d at 184–
85.  There we affirmed the denial of certification of a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class on predominance grounds, but noted 
that the district court also erred in denying certification 
based on ascertainability.  Id. at 184–85.  We concluded 
that the district court’s analysis “conflated 
ascertainability with the predominance inquiry.”  Id. 
at 184.  The predominance and ascertainability inquiries 
are distinct, we explained, because “‘the ascertainability 
requirement focuses on whether individuals fitting the 
class definition may be identified without resort to mini-
trials, whereas the predominance requirement focuses on 
whether essential elements of the class’s claims can be 
proven at trial with common, as opposed to 
individualized, evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d 
at 359). 
 Ascertainability is closely tied to the other relevant 
preliminary inquiry we addressed in Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
592, that plaintiffs provide a proper class definition, Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).  A trial court also needs a class to 
be “defined with reference to objective criteria” and 
some assurance that there can be “a reliable and 
administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class 
definition,” Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355, in order to rigorously 




requirements, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.  When 
combined with the separate class-definition requirement 
from Wachtel, that a class-certification order contain “a 
readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the 
parameters defining the class or classes to be certified,” 
453 F.3d at 187–88, district courts have the necessary 
tools to determine whether “a party seeking to maintain a 
class action” can “‘affirmatively demonstrate his 
compliance’ with Rule 23.”  See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1432 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011)). 
 And after certification, a trial court is tasked with 
providing “the best notice that is practicable” to the class 
members under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), “‘including individual 
notice to all class members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.’”  Larson v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 687 
F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(c)(2)(B)).  We are “stringent in enforcing th[at] 
individual notice requirement.”  Id. at 126.  The separate 
ascertainability requirement ensures that class members 
can be identified after certification, Carrera, 727 F.3d at 
308 n.2, and therefore better prepares a district court to 
“direct to class members the best notice that is 




23(c)(2)(B); see also Larson, 687 F.3d at 117 n.10, 123–
31 (applying the Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requirement).8 
 The ascertainability inquiry is narrow.  If 
defendants intend to challenge ascertainability, they must 
be exacting in their analysis and not infuse the 
ascertainability inquiry with other class-certification 
requirements.  As we said in Carrera, “ascertainability 
only requires the plaintiff to show that class members can 
be identified.”  727 F.3d at 308 n.2.  This inquiry will not 
                                                 
8 An additional post-certification concern relates to 
the argument by some that the class-action device fails in 
its purpose if a judgment or settlement cannot be 
executed without resulting in a largely cy pres fund.  
E.g., Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
statement respecting denial of certiorari) (noting 
“fundamental concerns surrounding the use of [cy pres] 
remedies in class action litigation”); In re Baby Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–74 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(upholding limited use of cy pres distributions but 
cautioning against largely cy pres funds).  Although we 
need not address the propriety of cy pres funds in this 
case, we do note that the risk of a cy pres fund is reduced, 
even if not entirely removed, when a court has 
affirmatively concluded that there is “a reliable and 
administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class 




be relevant in every case and is independent from the 
other requirements of Rule 23. 
B. 
 With this explanation of ascertainability in mind, 
we will reverse the District Court for four reasons.  First, 
the District Court abused its discretion by misstating the 
rule governing ascertainability.  Second, the District 
Court engrafted an “underinclusive” requirement that is 
foreign to our ascertainability standard.  Third, the 
District Court made an errant conclusion of law in 
finding that an “overly broad” class was not 
ascertainable.  And fourth, the District Court improperly 
applied the legal principles from Carrera to the issue of 
whether “household members” could be ascertainable. 
1. 
 The District Court misstated the law governing 
ascertainability by conflating our standards governing 
class definition with the ascertainability requirement.  
The District Court prefaced its discussion with the 
section header “Ascertainability and Defining the Class.”  
The District Court then stated the following as the 
applicable legal standard:  
“As an ‘essential prerequisite’ to the Rule 23 
analysis, the Court must consider 1) whether 




2) whether the named Plaintiffs are members 
of the class.  Marcus v. BMW of North 
America, 687 F.3d 583, 596 (3d Cir. 2012) . 
. . .  At the first step of the analysis, 
determining whether there is a precisely 
defined class entails two separate and 
important elements: ‘first, the class must be 
defined with reference to objective criteria’ 
and ‘second, there must be a reliable and 
administratively feasible mechanism for 
determining whether putative class members 
fall within the class definition.’  Hayes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 
(3d Cir. 2013).”  
Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *3. 
 Although the District Court is correct that the class 
definition requirements are applicable to a class-
certification order, Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187–88, and that 
class definition is a valid preliminary consideration, 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591–92, it was not the reason the 
District Court denied class certification.  What the 
District Court described as the two requirements for a 
“precisely defined class” was in fact the inquiry relevant 
to the ascertainability standard.  See Hayes, 725 F.3d 
at 355.  In blending the issue of ascertainability with that 
of class definition (which Marcus took pains to address 
as separate preliminary inquiries that preceded the Rule 




 Also troubling is the District Court’s discussion of 
class membership.  Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *3, *6 
n.8.  The question of “whether the named Plaintiffs are 
members of the class” has nothing to do with either the 
requirements of a class definition, Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 
187–88, or the ascertainability standard, Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 592–94.  In fact, the District Court’s citation to 
Marcus on this point related to its discussion of 
numerosity—not class definition or ascertainability.  See 
Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *3 (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d 
at 596 (discussing numerosity)).  And although the 
District Court generally cited to Hayes, in that case we 
addressed “membership” not as relating to 
ascertainability and only with regard to whether the 
named plaintiff had Article III standing to sue as a class 
representative.  See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 360–61.  In sum, 
we conclude that the District Court should have applied 
nothing more or less than the ascertainability test that has 
been consistently laid out by this Court. 
2. 
 The District Court also abused its discretion in 
determining that the proposed classes were not 
ascertainable because they were underinclusive.  The 
District Court reasoned that although the records 
provided by Aaron’s “may reveal the computers upon 
which Detective Mode was activated and the 
owner/lessee of that computer,” the Byrds did “not 




whose information was surreptitiously gathered.”  Byrd, 
2014 WL 1316055, at *5.  For this reason, the District 
Court explained, the proposed “class definition [did] not 
encompass all those individuals whose information ha[d] 
been surreptitiously gathered by Aaron’s franchisees.”  
Id.  But the District Court was looking to an old, no-
longer-operative class definition, see supra, n.3, because 
the Byrds had redefined the proposed classes by 
eliminating the requirement that a class member’s 
information was “intercepted” or “surreptitiously 
gathered.”9  Thus, the District Court’s analysis was not 
germane to the Byrds’ proposed class definitions or the 
relevant bases for class membership.   
                                                 
9 The ECPA permits any person to bring a civil 
action “whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation 
of this chapter.”  18 U.S.C. § 2520(a); see also id. § 
2511.  The Byrds’ operative complaint alleges that the 
PC Rental Agent “allows its installer (here, the rent-to-
own store) to remotely and surreptitiously build and 
activate the ‘Detective Mode’ function on the laptop over 
the Internet and through the Aaron’s Inc. and 
DesignerWare websites.”  Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at 
*2.  The relevant statutory terms were discussed because 
the District Court observed that “not all information 
gathered surreptitiously will constitute an ‘interception’ 
of the ‘contents’ of an ‘electronic communication’” by 




 Defendants contend that “underinclusiveness” was 
an appropriate consideration in support of the denial of 
class certification.  They rely on a district court decision, 
Bright v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 190, 197 
(D.N.J. 2013), to support their argument.  But “whether 
the defined class specifies a particular group that was 
harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular 
location, in a particular way,” Bright, 292 F.R.D. at 197 
(emphasis added), is not included in our ascertainability 
test.  Further, requiring such specificity may be 
unworkable in some cases and approaches requiring a 
fail-safe class.  See Messner v. Northshore Univ. 
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that a fail-safe class is “one that is defined so 
that whether a person qualifies as a member depends on 
whether the person has a valid claim”).  Defining the 
class “in terms of the legal injury,” In re Nexium 
Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d at 22, is not the same as 
requiring the class to be defined “with reference to 
objective criteria.”  See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355.   
 We decline to engraft an “underinclusivity” 
standard onto the ascertainability requirement.  
Individuals who are injured by a defendant but are 
excluded from a class are simply not bound by the 
outcome of that particular action.  Cf., e.g., Taylor v. 
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884, 894 (2008) (“Representative 
suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include 




Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 n.3 (1984) (“Under res 
judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further 
claims by parties or their privies on the same cause of 
action.”).  In the context of ascertainability, we have only 
mentioned “underinclusivity” with regard to whether the 
records used to establish ascertainability were sufficient, 
see Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355 (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
594), not whether there are injured parties that could also 
be included in the class.  Requiring a putative class to 
include all individuals who may have been harmed by a 
particular defendant could also severely undermine the 
named class representative’s ability to present typical 
claims (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)) and adequately 
represent the interests of the class (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(a)(4)).  The ascertainability standard is neither 
designed nor intended to force all potential plaintiffs who 
may have been harmed in different ways by a particular 
defendant to be included in the class in order for the class 
to be certified.   
3. 
 Similarly, the District Court also abused its 
discretion in determining that the proposed classes were 
not ascertainable because they were “overly broad.”  The 
District Court concluded that “more problematic for 
Plaintiffs is the fact that the alternative definitions are 
overly broad” because “[n]ot every computer upon which 
Detective Mode was activated will state a claim under the 




Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *5.  There was, again, no 
reference to our ascertainability precedent or that of any 
other court. 
 Defendants also rely on Bright for the proposition 
that a class is not “ascertainable if it is decoupled from 
the underlying allegations of harm rendering it . . . 
overbroad.”  See Bright, 292 F.R.D. at 197.  They also 
cite myriad cases from other district courts and courts of 
appeals to justify the consideration of overbreadth in our 
ascertainability standard.  Such applications of the 
ascertainability standard fuel the precise mistake we 
attempted to correct in Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics 
Inc.—that is, injecting the explicit requirements of Rule 
23 into the ascertainability standard without actually 
analyzing those requirements under the correct portion of 
Rule 23.  See 767 F.3d at 184 n.5 (“Predominance and 
ascertainability are separate issues.”).  And at oral 
argument, Defendants conceded that the District Court’s 
analysis regarding overbreadth was really identifying a 
potential predominance problem.   
 Defendants’ reliance on authority outside this 
Circuit does nothing to bolster their argument.  For 
example, they extensively discuss Oshana v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006), to support the 
proposition that an overbroad class is not ascertainable.  
In Oshana, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a 
class consisting of “all Illinois purchasers of fountain 




under Rule 23.  Id. at 509.  The Court required that in 
addition to satisfying the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements, a “plaintiff must also show . . . that the 
class is indeed identifiable as a class.”  Id. at 513.  
Reasoning that the proposed class could “include 
millions who were not deceived and thus have no 
grievance under the [Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Practices Act],” the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s determination that the proposed class 
was “not sufficiently definite to warrant class 
certification.”  Id. at 513–14. 
 The “definiteness” standard from Oshana is 
distinguishable from our Circuit’s ascertainability 
requirement.  The standard applied in the Seventh Circuit 
is based on the premise that because “[i]t is axiomatic 
that for a class action to be certified a ‘class’ must exist,” 
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981), a class 
definition must be definite enough for the class to be 
ascertained, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 
F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977).  In short, the class must be 
“indeed identifiable as a class.”  Oshana, 472 F.3d at 
513.  A class may be indefinite where “the relevant 
criteria for class membership [is] unknown.”  Jamie S. v. 
Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 2012).  
Although this doctrine is similar to the parameters laid 
out in our ascertainability cases, it blends together our 
Circuit’s ascertainability and class definition 




Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355, and Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187–
88.  As we made patent in Marcus, we address class 
definition and ascertainability as separate inquiries.  687 
F.3d at 591–94. 
 Defendants also argue that a proposed class is 
overbroad “where putative class members lack standing 
or have not been injured.”  Defendants’ argument 
conflates the issues of ascertainability, overbreadth (or 
predominance), and Article III standing.  We have 
explained that the issue of standing is separate from the 
requirements of Rule 23.  See, e.g., Holmes v. Pension 
Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“In addition to the requirements expressly 
enumerated in Rule 23, class actions are also subject to 
more generally applicable rules such as those governing 
standing and mootness.”).  To the extent Defendants 
meant to challenge any potential differences between the 
proposed class representatives and unnamed class 
members, such differences should be considered within 
the rubric of the relevant Rule 23 requirements—such as 
adequacy, typicality, commonality, or predominance.  
See Grandalski, 767 F.3d at 184–85; see also Holmes, 
213 F.3d at 137–38 (discussing an “overbroad” class as 
requiring individual determinations that fail to satisfy 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement).  Conversely, 
if Defendants intended to argue that all putative class 
members must have standing, such challenges should be 




Because the District Court has yet to conduct a rigorous 
analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, we decline to 
address these issues in the first instance.   
 The Byrds’ proposed classes consisting of 
“owners” and “lessees” are ascertainable.  There are 
“objective records” that can “readily identify” these class 
members, cf. Grandalski, 767 F.3d at 184 n.5, because, 
as explained by the District Court, “Aaron’s own records 
reveal the computers upon which Detective Mode was 
activated, as well as the full identity of the customer who 
leased or purchased each of those computers.”  Byrd, 
2014 WL 1316055, at *5.  The District Court’s 
conclusion to the contrary was an abuse of discretion. 
4. 
 The District Court again abused its discretion in 
determining that “household members” were not 
ascertainable.  The District Court concluded that the 
inclusion of the phrase “household members” in the 
Byrds’ revised class definitions was vague and not 
ascertainable.  In the Byrds’ reply brief on the motion for 
class-action certification, they asserted in a footnote that 
“[h]ousehold members can easily be objectively verified 
through personal and public records.  And their usage of 
the owner/lessee’s computers can also be easily 
objectively established.”  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended denying class certification because the 




preponderance of the evidence how “‘household 
members’ can be verified through personal and public 
records.” 
 In their objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation, the Byrds argued that they 
intended “the plain meaning of ‘household members.’”  
On appeal, the Byrds continue to argue that they intended 
the plain meaning of “household members” to be “all of 
the people, related or unrelated, who occupy a housing 
unit.”  By way of example, the Byrds cite to multiple 
definitions used in government documents for census, 
taxation, and immigration purposes.  With these 
definitions, they contend that the simple act of 
confirming membership would mean matching addresses 
in public records with that of an owner or lessee that had 
already been identified.   
 The “household members” of owners or lessees are 
ascertainable.  Although the government documents cited 
by the Byrds do contain slight variations on the definition 
of a household member (as noted by Defendants), the 
Byrds presented the District Court with various ways in 
which “household members” could be defined and how 
relevant records could be used to verify the identity of 
household members.  Because the District Court 
summarily adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, and no oral argument was held on the 
class-certification motion, we are left to wonder why the 




their objections to the Report and Recommendation was 
inadequate. 
 The parties also dispute whether the phrase 
“household members” is often used in class definitions.  
Although it is true that the phrase “household members” 
has been used in other class definitions,10 we decline the 
invitation categorically to conclude that the use of this 
phrase will always have sufficient precision in the 
ascertainability context.  The inquiry in any given case 
should be whether a class is “defined with reference to 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 827 n.5 (reversing 
the approval of an asbestos settlement class that 
happened to include “household member” in the class 
definition); Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 602 
(analyzing the validity of a class that included 
“household members” on grounds other than 
ascertainability); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 
F.3d 610, 619 & n.3, 633 (3d Cir. 1996) (including in the 
class “occupational exposure of a spouse or household 
member to asbestos, or to asbestos-containing products”), 
aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 291 F.R.D. 93, 
108 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (settlement class definition that 
included “household members”), appeal dismissed (July 
25, 2013); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 





objective criteria” and whether there is a “reliable and 
administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class 
definition.”  Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355.  Whether a class is 
ascertainable is dependent on the nature of the claims at 
issue.  But as used here, “household members” is a 
phrase that is easily defined and not, as Defendants 
argue, inherently vague.  
 We also conclude that Defendants’ and the District 
Court’s reliance on Carrera is misplaced.  In Carrera, 
we concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed reliance on 
affidavits alone, without any objective records to identify 
class members or a method to weed out unreliable 
affidavits, could not satisfy the ascertainability 
requirement.  727 F.3d at 311.  Here the Byrds presented 
the District Court with multiple definitions of class 
members and simply argued that a form similar to those 
provided could be used to identify household members.  
This is a far cry from an unverifiable affidavit, or the 
absence of any methodology that can be used later to 
ascertain class members.  See id. at 310–11.  
 The Byrds’ proposed method to ascertain 
“household members” is neither administratively 
infeasible nor a violation of Defendants’ due process 
rights.  Because the location of household members is 
already known (a shared address with one of the 895 
owners and lessees identified by the Byrds), there are 




incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class 
action.”  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  There will always be some 
level of inquiry required to verify that a person is a 
member of a class; for example, a person’s statement that 
she owned or leased an Aspen Way computer would 
eventually require anyone charged with administering the 
fund resulting from a successful class action to ensure 
that person is actually among the 895 customers 
identified by the Byrds.  Such a process of identification 
does not require a “‘mini-trial,’” nor does it amount to 
“‘individualized fact-finding,’” Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 
(quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594), and indeed must be 
done in most successful class actions.   
 Certainly, Carrera does not suggest that no level 
of inquiry as to the identity of class members can ever be 
undertaken.  If that were the case, no Rule 23(b)(3) class 
could ever be certified.  We are not alone in concluding 
that “the size of a potential class and the need to review 
individual files to identify its members are not reasons to 
deny class certification.”  See Young v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases).  To hold otherwise would seriously 
undermine the purpose of a Rule 23(b)(3) class to 
aggregate and vindicate meritorious individual claims in 
an efficient manner.  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(b)(3) 1966 
advisory committee’s notes (Rule 23(b)(3) “achieve[s] 




uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, 
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about 
other undesirable results.”). 
 As to Defendants’ contention that their due process 
rights would be violated, Carrera counsels that this due 
process right relates to the ability to “challenge the proof 
used to demonstrate class membership.”  727 F.3d at 307.  
Here, the Byrds are not relying solely on unverified 
affidavits to establish ascertainability.  See id. at 307–08; 
Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356 (reasoning that a class is not 
ascertainable where “the only proof of class membership 
[was] the say-so of putative class members”).  Any form 
used to indicate a household member’s status in the 
putative class must be reconciled with the 895 known 
class members or some additional public records.  
Defendants are not foreclosed from challenging the 
evidence the Byrds propose to use.   
 In sum, the District Court erred in its application of 
Carrera and in concluding that the phrase “household 
members” was inherently vague. 
C. 
 In light of the errors discussed above, we will 
remand to the District Court to consider the remaining 
Rule 23 certification requirements in the first instance.  
At oral argument and in their briefs, Defendants urged us 




predominance, independently review the record in this 
case, and conclude that the Byrds’ proposed classes fail 
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  
Defendants contend that the elements of an ECPA claim, 
particularly that each plaintiff must show the interception 
of the “contents” of an “electronic communication,” 
create insurmountable barriers to proving predominance.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (c), (d).  Formidable though 
these barriers may be, they are not for us to address in the 
first instance. 
 Beginning in General Telephone Co. of Southwest 
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–161 (1982), through its 
recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1432, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
the need for a district court to conduct a rigorous analysis 
of the evidence in support of certification under Rule 23.  
“By their nature, interlocutory appeals are disruptive, 
time-consuming, and expensive”; thus, it makes sense to 
allow the “district court an opportunity to fine-tune its 
class certification order . . . rather than opening the door 
too widely to interlocutory appellate review.”  Waste 
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294–95 
(1st Cir. 2000) (exercising discretionary authority under 
Rule 23(f) in order to give a district court “a better sense 
as to which aspects of the class certification decision 
might reasonably be open to subsequent 
reconsideration”).  This is consistent with the narrow, yet 




Rule 23(f) petition.  See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164–65 (3d Cir. 
2001); see also In re Nat’l Football League Players 
Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 578 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2014).  We best exercise appellate review when the dust 
has settled and a district court has fully considered a 
motion for class-action certification. 
 What is more, a close reading of Defendants’ 
response briefs demonstrates how they continue to 
conflate ascertainability with the other relevant 
requirements of Rule 23.  We write again to emphasize 
that at class certification, Rule 23’s explicit requirements 
go beyond and are separate from the ascertainability 
inquiry.  Precise analysis of relevant Rule 23 
requirements will always be necessary.  We therefore 
decline to go beyond the scope of the District Court’s 
opinion. 
V. 
 The District Court erred both in relying on an 
errant conclusion of law and improperly applying law to 
fact.  Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for 
further consideration in light of this opinion. 
 
 
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree with the majority that, under our current 
jurisprudence, the class members here are clearly 
ascertainable.  Indeed, as Judge Smith points out, “Aaron’s 
own records reveal the computers upon which Detective 
Mode was activated, as well as the full identity of the 
customer who leased or purchased each of those computers.” 
(Maj. Op. at 37) (quoting Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-cv-
101, 2014 WL 1316055, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014)).  It 
is hard to argue otherwise, and I do not.  However, I do 
suggest that the lengths to which the majority goes in its 
attempt to clarify what our requirement of ascertainability 
means, and to explain how this implicit requirement fits in the 
class certification calculus, indicate that the time has come to 
do away with this newly created aspect of Rule 23 in the 
Third Circuit.  Our heightened ascertainability requirement 
defies clarification.  Additionally, it narrows the availability 






 Historically, the ascertainability inquiry related to 
whether the court will be able to determine who fits within 
the class definition for purposes of award or settlement 
distribution and the preclusion of the relitigation of claims.1 
 It is a test that scrutinizes the class definition, and properly  
                                              
1 See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.222 
(2004) (“An identifiable class exists if its members can be 
ascertained by reference to objective criteria.”); Joseph M. 
McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:2 (11th ed. 
2014) (“[C]lass members need to be able to determine with 
certainty from a class notice whether they are in the class. . . . 
If the class definition is amorphous, persons may not 
recognize that they are in the class, and thus may be deprived 
of the opportunity to object or opt out.”); 5 James Wm. 
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.21[1] (3d ed. 





so.2  But this is now only the first element of our two-part test 
for ascertainability.  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687  
F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Hayes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The class 
must be defined with reference to objective criteria.”). 
 
                                              
2 Courts have found classes to be ascertainable when the class 
definition is sufficiently specific.  Compare Parkinson v. 
Hyundai Motor Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 593 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(holding that prospective plaintiffs are capable of determining 
whether they were class members because class definition 
included purchasers of a certain vehicle who paid for the 
replacement of a certain part in a certain time period), and 
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 31-32 (D.D.C. 
2003) (holding that prospective class members are capable of 
identifying themselves based on the dates of their 
incarceration included in the class definition), and Pigford v. 
Gickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 346 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that 
class members are capable of identifying themselves based on 
whether they had applied for participation in a USDA federal 
farm program during the specified dates), with In re Copper 
Antitrust Litig., 196 F.R.D. 348, 350-51, 358-60 (W.D. Wis. 
2000) (refusing to certify class of “[a]ll copper or metals 
dealers . . . that purchased physical copper” during a specified 
time period “at prices expressly related to LME or Comex 
copper future prices” because the class definition fell “far 
short of communicating to copper purchasers what they need 
to know to decide whether they are in or outside the proposed 
class,” in that the definition failed to explain the terms 





 In 2012 we adopted a second element, namely, 
requiring district courts to make certain that there is “a 
reliable, administratively feasible” method of determining 
who fits into the class, thereby imposing a heightened 
evidentiary burden.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594.  We have 
precluded class certification unless there can be objective 
proof—beyond mere affidavits—that someone is actually a 
class member.  Id.; accord Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 
300, 308-12 (3d Cir. 2013).  This concept has gained traction 
in recent years.3  I submit that this “business record” or 
                                              
3 Several courts have denied class certification on 
ascertainability grounds similar to our current ascertainability 
test.  See, e.g., Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 
679, 689 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (denying certification of class suing 
defendant for mislabeling product as “All Natural” in 
violation of Florida’s deceptive advertising law because 
potential class members were unlikely to remember if they 
bought a product with such a label); In re Skelaxin 
(Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 572 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2014) (denying certification of class suing drug 
manufacturer for violating antitrust laws because plaintiffs 
did not propose feasible model for screening fraudulent 
claims); Brey Corp. v. LQ Mgmt. LLC, No. 11-cv-718, 2014 
WL 943445, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2014) (denying 
certification of class suing defendant for violating antitrust 
laws because ascertaining who belongs in the class would 




“paper trail” requirement is ill-advised.4  In most low-value 
consumer class actions, prospective class members are 
unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase, because very 
few people keep receipts from drug stores or grocery stores.  
This should not be the reason to deny certification of a class.5  
As Judge Ambro’s dissent from the denial of the petition for 
rehearing en banc in Carrera noted, “[w]here a defendant’s 
lack of records . . . make it more difficult to ascertain the 
members of an otherwise objectively verifiable low-value 
class, the consumers who make up that class should not be 
made to suffer.”  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 
WL 3887938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J. 
dissenting).   
 
 Records are not the only way to prove that someone is 
                                              
4 While the majority cites a footnote in Carrera as standing 
for the proposition that we have no “records requirement,” the 
class in Carrera failed the ascertainability test because there 
were no records from which the class members could be 
ascertained with certainty.  (Maj. Op. at 25 (citing Carrera, 
727 F.3d at 308. n.2)). 
5 See, e.g., McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, No. 13-cv-242, 
2014 WL 1779243, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (“It 
appears that pursuant to Carerra [sic] in any case where the 
consumer does not have a verifiable record of its purchase, 
such as a receipt, and the manufacturer or seller does not keep 
a record of buyers, Carerra [sic] prohibits certification of the 
class.”); Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 
535 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (warning that, if lack of receipts dooms 
certification, “there would be no such thing as a consumer 
class action” in cases concerning false or deceptive labeling 




in a class.  It is the trial judge’s province to determine what 
proof may be required at the claims submission and claims 
administration stage.  It is up to the judge overseeing the class 
action to decide what she will accept as proof when 
approving the claim form.  Could not the judge decide that, in 
addition to an individual’s “say so” that he is a member of the 
class, the claimant needs to submit an affidavit from another 
household member or from his doctor corroborating his 
assertion that he did, in fact, take Bayer aspirin?  Is that not 
permissible and appropriate?  Yet, we foreclose this process 
at the outset of the case by requiring that plaintiffs conjure up 
all the ways that they might find the evidence sufficient to 
approve someone as a class member.  
 
 This puts the class action cart before the horse and 
confuses the class certification process, as this case makes 
manifest.  The irony of this result is that it thwarts “[t]he 
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism,” i.e., 
“to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not 
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action 
prosecuting his or her rights.”  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).  Indeed, 
“[a] class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”  Id.  We have 
effectively thwarted small-value consumer class actions by 
defining ascertainability in such a way that consumer classes 




substantiation.6  Consumers now need to keep a receipt or a 
can, bottle, tube, or wrapper of the offending consumer items 
in order to succeed in bringing a class action. 
                                              
6 Small-value consumer class actions certified by district 
courts nationwide would not pass muster in our Circuit 
because of our heightened ascertainability requirement.  See, 
e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 
(7th Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s order decertifying 
class of consumers who brought action against owners of 
automatic teller machines for failing to post notice on 
machines that they charged fee for use despite difficulty in 
determining which plaintiffs would have been deceived by 
lack of notice); Ebin v. Kangadis Food Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 
567 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (certifying class of consumers who 
claimed defendant placed misleading “All Natural” label on 
olive oil bottles even though plaintiffs were unlikely to have 
retained receipts or packaging proving membership in class); 
Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 
408, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (certifying class of plaintiffs who 
possessed promotional gift cards stating “No expiration date” 
that were voided by defendant or told that the cards had 
expired or been voided and thrown away cards even though 
some class members would only be able to claim class 
membership through affidavit); see also Lilly v. Jamba Juice 
Co., No. 13-cv-2998, 2014 WL 4652283, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 18, 2014) (certifying class of consumers who purchased 
frozen smoothie kits containing label “All Natural” where 
product allegedly contained various artificial ingredients and 
where consumers did not necessarily have proof of purchase); 
Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 658-59, 672 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (certifying class of plaintiffs who purchased 




 The policy rationales that we cite in support of our 
expanded ascertainability requirement are relatively weak 
when compared to the significant policy justifications that 
motivate the class action mechanism.  We have noted three 
rationales for our ascertainability requirement: (1) eliminating 
administrative burdens “incongruous” with the efficiencies of 
a class action, (2) protecting absent class members’ rights to 
opt out by facilitating the best notice practicable, and (3) 
protecting the due process rights of defendants to challenge 
plaintiffs’ proffered evidence of harm.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
593. 
                                                                                                     
misrepresentations even though class members would have to 
self-identify without corroborating evidence); Forcellati v. 
Hylands, Inc., No. 12-1983, 2014 WL 1410264, at *5, *13 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (certifying class of plaintiffs who 
purchased children’s cold or flu products within a prescribed 
time frame despite purchasers’ lack of proof of purchase and 
defendants’ lack of records identifying consumers who 
purchased their products via retail intermediaries); McCrary, 
2014 WL 1779243, at *7-8 (certifying class of purchasers of 
dietary joint supplement containing allegedly deceptive label 
despite plaintiffs’ lack of proof of purchase); Astiana v. Kashi 
Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (certifying class of 
consumers who purchased cereal and snack products labeled 
as “All Natural” or “Nothing Artificial” but which allegedly 
contained synthetic ingredients in violation of various false 
advertising laws even though plaintiffs unlikely to have 
retained receipts or containers); Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 535 
(certifying class of consumers who purchased iced tea with 
“natural” on label despite plaintiffs’ lack of proofs of 





 Eliminating “administrative burdens” really means 
short-circuiting the claims process by assuming that when 
individuals file claims, they burden the court.  But claims 
administration is part of every class action.  Imposing a proof-
of-purchase requirement does nothing to ensure the 
manageability of a class or the “efficiencies” of the class 
action mechanism; rather, it obstructs certification by 
assuming that hypothetical roadblocks will exist at the claims 
administration stage of the proceedings.7 
 
 Denying class certification due to concerns about 
providing notice to class members makes little sense.  Rule 23 
requires the “best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances” to potential class members after a class has 
been certified.8  Potential difficulties in providing 
individualized notice to all class members should not be a 
reason to deny certification of a class.  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, due process is 
satisfied when notice is “reasonably calculated” to reach the 
defined class.  472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  The question is not 
whether every class member will receive actual individual 
notice, but whether class members can be notified of their 
opt-out rights consistent with due process.  See Dusenbery v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002) (holding that due process 
did not require actual notice to federal prisoner of his right to 
contest civil forfeiture, but rather, due process must be 
                                              
7 See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is a big difference from the 
standpoint of manageability between the liability and remedy 
phases of a class action.”). 




“reasonably calculated” to apprise a party of the pendency of 
an action).9     
 
 The concerns regarding the due process rights of 
defendants are unwarranted as well, because there is no 
evidence that, in small-claims class actions, fabricated claims 
impose a significant harm on defendants.  The chances that 
someone would, under penalty of perjury, sign a false 
affidavit stating that he or she bought Bayer aspirin for the 
sake of receiving a windfall of $1.59 are far-fetched at best.  
On the other hand, while most injured individuals will find 
that it is not worth the effort to claim the few dollars in 
damages that the class action can provide, in the aggregate, 
this sum is significant enough to deter corporate misconduct.  
Our ascertainability doctrine, by focusing on making 
absolutely certain that compensation is distributed only to 
those individuals who were actually harmed, has ignored an 
equally important policy objective of class actions: deterring 
and punishing corporate wrongdoing.  As Judge Posner, 
writing for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
stated in Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprises, Inc., “when 
what is small is not the aggregate but the individual claim . . . 
that’s the type of case in which class action treatment is most 
needful. . . . A class action, like litigation in general, has a 
deterrent as well as a compensatory objective.”  731 F.3d 672, 
677 (7th Cir. 2013).  The rigorous application of the 
ascertainability requirement translates into impunity for 
                                              
9 See also Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 159 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1975) (“We do not mean to indicate that individual notice 
must be given in all cases.”).  Furthermore, Rule 23 requires 
courts to provide the best practicable notice after a class has 




corporate defendants who have harmed large numbers of 
consumers in relatively modest increments.10  Without the 
class action mechanism, corporations selling small-value 
items for which it is unlikely that consumers would keep 
receipts are free to engage in false advertising, overcharging, 
and a variety of other wrongs without consequence.   
 
 The concerns about defendants’ due process rights are 
also overblown because damages liability under Rule 23 is 
determined in the aggregate: courts determine the extent of a 
defendant’s monetary liability to the entire class.  Therefore, 
whether an individual can establish membership in that class 
does not affect the rights of defendants not to pay in excess of 
their liability.  Carrera’s concern that allowing undeserving 
individuals to claim damages will dilute deserving class 
                                              
10 As one court has noted,  
 
[a]dopting the Carrera approach would have 
significant negative ramifications for the ability 
to obtain redress for consumer injuries.  Few 
people retain receipts for low-priced goods, 
since there is little possibility they will need to 
later verify that they made the purchase.  Yet it 
is precisely in circumstances like these, where 
the injury to any individual consumer is small, 
but the cumulative injury to consumers as a 
group is substantial, that the class action 
mechanism provides one of its most important 
social benefits.  
 
Lilly, 2014 WL 4652283, at *4 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & 




members’ recoveries is unrealistic in modern day class action 
practice, and it makes little sense when used to justify the 
wholesale dooming of the small-value class action such that 
no injured plaintiff can recover at all.  Moreover, this is an 
issue to be dealt with in the implementation of a class action 
settlement, not in conjunction with ascertaining the class for 
purposes of certification.  Concerns about claims processing 
should not be used to scuttle these types of class actions 
altogether. 
 
 The policy concerns animating our ascertainability 
doctrine boil down to ensuring that there is a surefire way to 
get damages into the hands of only those individuals who we 
can be 100% certain have suffered injury, and out of the 
hands of those who may not have.  However, by disabling 
plaintiffs from bringing small-value claims as a class, we 
have ensured that other policy goals of class actions—
compensation of at least some of the injured and deterrence of 
wrongdoing, for example—have been lost.  In small-claims 
class actions like Carrera, the real choice for courts is 
between compensating a few of the injured, on the one hand, 
versus compensating none while allowing corporate 
malfeasance to go unchecked, on the other.  As such, where 
there are small-value claims, class actions offer the only 
means for achieving individual redress.  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Eisen, when individual damages are so low, 
“[e]conomic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a 
class action or not at all.”  417 U.S. at 161.  The concern that 
we are defeating what is at the “core” of what the class action 
was designed to accomplish is very real.  As Judge Rakoff 
noted in certifying a class over objections regarding 




 [T]he class action device, at its very core, is 
designed for cases like this where a large 
number of consumers have been defrauded but 
no one consumer has suffered an injury 
sufficiently large as to justify bringing an 
individual lawsuit. Against this background, the 
ascertainability difficulties, while formidable, 
should not be made into a device for defeating 
the action. 
 
Ebin v. Kangadis Food Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014).  While a rigorous insistence on a proof-of-purchase 
requirement, which our heightened ascertainability 
jurisprudence has imposed, keeps damages from the 
uninjured, it does an equally effective job of keeping damages 
from the truly injured as well, and “it does so with brutal 
efficiency.”11 
 
 Therefore, while I concur in the judgment, I suggest 
that it is time to retreat from our heightened ascertainability 
requirement in favor of following the historical meaning of 
ascertainability under Rule 23.  I would therefore reverse the 
District Court’s ruling, and hold that (1) hereafter, our 
ascertainability analysis will focus on class definition only, 
and (2) the District Court’s analysis regarding the second 
prong of our ascertainability test was unnecessary.  We thus 
would instruct the District Court to proceed to determine 
whether the class can be certified under the traditional 
mandates of Rule 23.  Until we revisit this issue as a full 
                                              
11 Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial 
Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 




Court or it is addressed by the Supreme Court or the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules, we will continue to administer the 
ascertainability requirement in a way that contravenes the 
purpose of Rule 23 and, in my view, disserves the public.   
